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LABOR LAW-INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR STATUS-EXTENSION OF THE
RIGHT OF CONTROL TEST-Petitioner, a large independent oil company,
owned a gasoline service station which it leased to an individual operator,
reserving the right to determine certain aspects of the lessee's operations. 1
During the lease period, a majority of the station attendants signed
union authorization cards, and the union requested a meeting with the
lessee for the purpose of negotiating a contract. The lessee refused to
negotiate, discharged the attendants, and hired replacements. The trial
examiner found that petitioner, as an employer of his lessee, had violated
section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act by refusing to
bargain.2 On appeal, held, affirmed. Under the "right of control" test, the
petitioner is an employer of the lessee; as the employer, petitioner is
responsible for the unfair labor practice of his employee and therefore
must rehire the station attendants3 and pay their back wages. Site Oil Co.,
137 N.L.R.B. 1274 (1962).
Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act contained no comprehensive definition of "employee."4 The Taft-Hartley Act, however, included
an amendment to section 2(3) which excluded independent contractors
from the category of employees. 5 This attempt to narrow the employee
concept6 reversed the judicial trend evidenced by NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc. 7 In that case, the Supreme Court, in holding newspaper
vendors to be employees, refused to apply the old common-law distinction
between independent contractors and employees because it felt the policy
behind the statute required a broader test. The House report on the TaftHartley Act, on the other hand, specified that the terms independent
contractor and employee were to be given their ordinary legal meanings,
and not the broad definitions of the Hearst case.8 Further, the House
report indicated that the essential difference between an employee and
an independent contractor was that the former worked for wages, whereas
the latter was compensated by profits.9 The NLRB, instead of adopting
this quite narrow approach, has applied, in every subsequent case, the
1 The lease was terminable on thirty days notice by either party; it required the lessee
to make a substantial payment to obtain the lease, gave the lessee the right to hire and
discharge the attendants and set their wages, required the lessee to obtain approval
to sell any items other than the oil company's products, and provided that all gas
and oil would be delivered on a consignment basis and would be sold at a price set
by the oil company.
2 NLRA § 8(a)(5), as amended, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1958).
s The station had burned to the ground after the discharge of the original attendants and the petitioner was required to rehire them only if it decided to rebuild the
station.
4 NLRA § 2(3), 49 Stat. 450 (1935).
IS LMRA § IOI, 61 Stat. 137-38 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1958).
o See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947).
7 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
8 H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 6, at 18.
D Ibid.
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somewhat broader "right of control" test.10 This test focuses on whether
the person for whom the services are being performed has control over
the manner and means by which the result is to be accomplished.11 If
the former has such control, the person performing the services is an
employee. On the other hand, if the person for whom the services are
being performed specifies only the result to be accomplished and has no
substantial control over the method used to achieve it, the person hired is
an independent contractor within the meaning of the statute. The decisions
have recognized that the basic question as to whether the amount of
control retained is sufficient to make the relationship one of employment
is to be determined from the facts of each case, with no one factor being
determinative.12 Nevertheless, the courts have announced several factors
which are significant indications of the type of relationship involved in
a given case.13 Among the more important factors are whether the alleged
employee (I) has the right to hire and discharge the people actually
doing the work; (2) has control of the premises where the work is being
done; (3) furnishes the tools and materials; and (4) stands to make a profit
from those working under him.14
While the principal case purports to apply this same "right of control"
test to determine the relationship between the petitioner and its lessee,15
it seems the Board may have extended the scope of the test beyond its
traditional bounds. Although the test, as verbalized by the courts, is
indefinite and therefore cannot provide an absolute basis for decision in
a given case, reliance upon the factors referred to has made possible
some consistency. This approach requires the courts to balance one factor
against another, 16 and the cases have shown a tendency of the courts
to favor the party able to support his position with a preponderance of
the critical factors. The principal case appears to reach a result contrary
to that dictated by the application of these criteria. The lessee had the
right to hire and discharge the station attendants and set their wages
without consulting the petitioner.17 Even more important, the lessee
10 E.g., American Broadcasting Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 13 (1957); Albert Lea Co-op. Creamery Ass'n, 119 N.L.R.B. 817 (1957).
11 American Broadcasting Co., supra note 10, at 18.
12 Ibid.; Koontz Creamery, Inc., 102 N.L.R.B. 1619, 1623 (1953).
13 See United Ins. Co. of America v. NLRB, 304 F.2d 86, 89 (7th Cir. 1962); National
Van Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 273 F.2d 402, 405 (7th Cir. 1960).
14 National Van Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, supra note 13, at 405. Another factor which
may be taken into consideration is the intent of the parties as expressed in their
contract. However, the court will ignore this when the other factors point strongly to
a different relationship.
15 Principal case at 1275.
16 See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 716 (1947).
17 The lessee also furnished the tools which were used at the station and was
responsible for the management of the station, although the oil company made suggestions as to the arrangement of displays and like matters. Only tl'l'o factors appear
to support the result: (1) the oil company computed the station rent with regard to
sales of gasoline, much like a commission basis; and (2) the gasoline was furnished
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was not paid a wage by the petitioner, but was compensated by the
profits he made on the sale of gasoline and other commodities. 18 In a
similar factual setting, the NLRB recently held, in Clark Oil & Refining
Corp., 10 that such a lessee is an independent contractor. The majority in
the principal case relegated Clark to a footnote, distinguishing it on its
facts and seemingly ignoring any similarities between the cases. Instead
of balancing the various factors for and against the result reached, the
majority stressed only those particular facts which tended to support its
conclusion.20 Thus the principal case seems to have broadened the definition of employee by a subtle but substantial extension of the "right of
control" test.
In order to determine the advisability of expanding the employment
relationship, it is necessary to consider the consequences of such expansion.
First, the employer may be held responsible for the unfair labor practices
of his employee.21 Second, once it has been decided that the lessee is an
employee of the petitioner, the service station attendants are also the
petitioner's employees.22 A logical extension of this analysis leads to
the conclusion that the petitioner should be ultimately responsible for the
attendants' wages, pensions, unemployment benefits, and workmen's compensation. The principal case apparently lends weight to this conclusion.
The remedy given by the NLRB made the petitioner liable for the back
wages of the discharged attendants. This at least suggests that the oil
company may be liable for their wages whenever the lessee defaults. The
attendants' wages, however, are determined by the contract of employment
between them and the lessee. This contract may also contain job security
provisions and many other terms with corresponding responsibilities imposed on the employer. If the oil company is to be liable for the attendants'
wages, it may also be liable for the other benefits secured by the same
contract.
on consignment. In fact, the strength of even these factors was diluted by the requirement that the lessee pay a substantial sum of money to obtain the lease.
18 Even though the petitioner set the price at which the lessee could sell, the lessee
controlled his profit by such factors as the volume he sold, the minimization of his
overhead, and the wage scale he used to pay his attendants. Furthermore, the lessee
obtained additional revenue from his sales of items other than the oil company's
products.
10 129 N.L.R.B. 750 (1960).
20 The dissenting member in the principal case pointed out several factors, such
as the amount of capital necessary to enter the business, which tended to support the
petitioner's argument that the lessee was an independent contractor. He also stressed
the fact that the lease in Clark was substantially identical in every important detail
to the lease in the principal case, the terms of which are set out in note I supra.
21 NLRA § 2(2), as amended, 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1958), includes
in the definition of employer "any person acting as an agent of an employer" and
NLRA § 2(13), as amended, 61 Stat. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(13) (1958) provides that a
person may be an agent even though the specific acts performed were not actually authorized. A supervisory employee is considered the employer's agent within the meaning of
the act. J. D. Jewell, Inc., 99 N.L.R.B. 61 (1952).
·
22 Shell Oil Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 371 (1950).
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Confronted by the certainty that it will be liable for the unfair labor
practices of the lessee, together with the possibility that it will be bound
by all the terms of the attendants' employment contracts, the petitioner
may well alter its leasing arrangement so as to control this liability. The
company has two alternatives. It may either increase its influence over
the lessee to the point where petitioner negotiates with the union for
the attendants' contracts, or it may relinquish some of its control in the
hope of avoiding a relationship of employment between it and the lessee.
I£ the former approach is adopted, the lessee will certainly be no more
than a supervisory employee. This will effectively destroy what has
hitherto been one of the largest groups of small businessmen in our
economy,23 and it flies in the £ace of a concerted effort by Congress,
through special legislation, to protect the vitality of small business in
this country.24 On the other hand, if the oil company seeks to redraw
the lease so as to reduce control over the lessee and thereby render him
an independent contractor, the company may still destroy service station
operation as a major small business. This result would follow if the
company, in trying to make the lessee an independent contractor, decides
to charge a flat rental for the station instead of one related to sales, or
ceases to sell its products to the lessee on a consignment basis. Either
of these steps would greatly increase the financial burdens on the lessee
and would consequently reduce the number of those able to raise the
necessary capital. Furthermore, under the principal case the oil company
cannot be sure exactly how much of, or what aspects of control they
must give up to satisfy the "right of control" test.
Although certainty is desirable in this area, the endless variety of
terms possible in such contracts makes it impossible for the courts or
Congress to establish an absolute standard to determine whether a person
is an independent contractor. An approach like that of the principal case,
however, serves only to promote further uncertainty by departing from
the existing, albeit indefinite, standards of the prior cases, while phrasing
the rationale of the decision in terms of those standards. I£ an extension
of the "employee" concept is desired, it would be far better to enunciate
new criteria on which to base the determination than to erase the
boundaries of the established "right of control" test. The most practical
solution may be for the NLRB to indicate certain provisions it will
consider compatible with the retention of the independent contractor
status. At a minimum, this would provide the oil companies with a guaranteed method of relieving themselves of liability if they should so desire.

F. Bruce Kulp, Jr.
28 AMERICAN PErROLEUM INsrITUTE, PErROLEUM FAcrs AND FIGURES 149 (1961). This
table indicates that in 1960, sales by gasoline service stations (including all items sold
at such stations) were equal to 8.01% of the total retail sales in the United States on
the basis of dollar volume.
24 Barnes, What Government Efforts A.re Being Made To Assist Small Business,
2f: LAW &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 3 (1959).

